is is the penultimate version. Please consult the official version in Philosophical Studies.
Conventional wisdom has it that many intriguing features of indicative conditionals aren't shared by subjunctive conditionals. Subjunctive morphology is common in discussions of wishes and wants, however, and conditionals are commonly used in such discussions as well. As a result such discussions are a good place to look for subjunctive conditionals that exhibit features usually associated with indicatives alone. Here I offer subjunctive versions of J. L. Austin's 'biscuit' (or 'relevance') conditionals (, ), and subjunctive versions of Allan Gibbard's 'stand-off ' or 'Sly Pete' conditionals (, -). My cases undercut views according to which the indicative/subjunctive divide marks a great difference in the meaning of conditionals. ey also make trouble for treatments of indicative conditionals that cannot readily be generalized to subjunctives. anks to Benj Hellie and Jason Stanley for the conversation that led to this paper. For helpful discussion, thanks to Kai von Fintel, Allan Gibbard, Franz Huber, Janneke Huitink, Sarah Moss, and an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies.
For extensive discussion, see I . 
. Subjunctive biscuit conditionals
e ample literature on biscuit conditionals assumes (and sometimes asserts) that all biscuit conditionals are indicative. For example, Renaat Declerck and Susan Reed write that biscuit conditionals "…cannot appear in the form of pattern  ['If she came I would tell her everything'] or pattern  ['If she had come I would have told her everything']" conditionals (, ). But the underlined conditionals in () and () ought to count as biscuit conditionals:
() I want to vacation in a posh hotel in London. We would have tea every aernoon, and there would be biscuits on the sideboard, if one were so inclined.
() I wish we had decided to vacation in a posh hotel in London. We would have had tea every aernoon, and there would have been biscuits on the sideboard, if one had been so inclined.
Both of the conditionals in () and () resemble more familiar biscuit conditionals in failing to exhibit the features of "genuine conditionality" (G & L , -) . Most tellingly, () conveys that there would be biscuits on the sideboard whether or not one were so inclined, and () conveys there would have been biscuits on the sideboard whether or not one had been so inclined. A speaker could use such conditionals to avoid atly asserting that there would be (or would have been) biscuits on the sideboard, if the speaker does not want to presuppose that the addressee cares whether there would be (or would have been) biscuits on the sideboard. is exactly parallels Austin's original example: () conveys that there are biscuits on the sideboard whether or not the addressee wants them, and allows the speaker to convey this without avoid presupposing that the addressee wants biscuits.
() ere are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them.
Just as "it would be folly to … understand the meaning of [()] to be that you have only to want biscuits to cause them to be on the sideboard" (A , ), it would be folly to understand the meaning of () to be that on a vacation in a posh hotel in London you would have only to be so inclined for biscuits to appear. Similarly for ().
Here are two hybrids-biscuit conditionals with indicative antecedents and subjunctive consequents.  () I want to vacation in a posh hotel in London. We would have tea every aernoon, and there would be biscuits on the sideboard, if you're into that sort of thing.
() I wish we had decided to vacation in a posh hotel in London. We would have had tea every aernoon, and there would have been biscuits on the sideboard, if you're into that sort of thing.
Like (), (), and (), the conditionals in () and () do not suggest that the presence of biscuits on the sideboard is in any way conditional on whether or not the addressee would care to indulge. But there is one subtle difference between these examples and those in () and (), respectively: even a person who isn't "into that sort of thing" might allow that she could nd herself caught up in the moment (and desiring biscuits) were she to vacation in a posh hotel in London. So () and () target the addressee's present attitude toward biscuits more directly than () and () do.
Although the syntactic forms of the conditionals in (), (), (), and () are importantly different from those of their indicative counterparts, subjunctive biscuit conditionals pass an impressive range of syntactic tests ordinarily associated with indicative biscuit conditionals. is suggests that even in their syntax indicative and subjunctive biscuit conditionals form a relatively uni ed class. Sabine Iatridou in uentially discusses several syntactic features of indicative biscuit conditionals in her . I'll focus on three of those features here: the obligatory absence of conditional 'then' in certain biscuit conditionals; binding data that suggest that the consequents of biscuit conditionals cannot c-command their antecedents; and the inability of the antecedents of biscuit conditionals to serve as the rst constituent in certain Verb Second languages. First, adding conditional 'then' changes the meanings of () and () to meanings on which the consequent's truth somehow depends on the truth of the antecedent: () I want to vacation in a posh hotel in London. We would have tea every aernoon, and if one were so inclined then there would be biscuits on the sideboard.
() I wish we had decided to vacation in a posh hotel in London. We would have had tea every aernoon, and if one had been so inclined then there would have been biscuits on the sideboard.
is is a classic indication of a biscuit conditional (D , -). As Iatridou puts it, () "could be interpreted as saying that your being thirsty will cause the appearance of a beer in the fridge, and with this interpretation then can appear"
See also I  and B & P .  (, ).
() If you're thirsty, ( then) there is a beer in the fridge.
But the addition of 'then' here precludes a biscuit reading, leaving available only a 'magical connection' reading of ()-the same kind of reading that is obligatory for () and (). Second, on the basis of the contrast between () and the biscuit conditional (), and the contrast between () and the biscuit conditional (), Iatridou argues that "an anaphor or a reciprocal inside [a hypothetical conditional's antecedent] can be bound by the matrix subject" but that the matrix subject cannot bind into a biscuit conditional's antecedent (, -).⁴ Subjunctive biscuit conditionals are unusual enough that it's important to control for other reasons why () and () might sound bad. But () and () are ne.
⁴Judgments about Iatridou's original examples (and about my examples) are mixed; some informants nd (), (), (), and () marginal at best. Many of these informants nevertheless see contrasts between the elements of the relevant pairs. Whether or not such contrasts on their own are sufficient for all of Iatridou's purposes, they may be helpful diagnostics for biscuit conditionals. Informants who nd no contrast between these pairs, of course, simply need to fall back on other diagnostics. (anks to an anonymous reviewer for Philosophical Studies for discussion.) () Mary and Bill would have known where to nd me if stories about them had been told.
() Mary and Bill would have known where to nd me if they had been so inclined.
So here again, indicative and subjunctive biscuit conditionals pattern together. ird, indicative and subjunctive biscuit conditionals pattern together in certain 'Verb Second' languages-roughly, languages in which the verb must be the second constituent of a nite clause.⁵ In Dutch and German, for example, the antecedents of ordinary indicative conditionals generally serve as the rst constituent, forcing the subject to follow the matrix verb. Klaus-Michael Köpcke and Klaus-Uwe Panther give the following minimal pair for German (, ) So German's way of disambiguating between indicative biscuit and hypothetical conditionals is robust enough to carry over to their subjunctive counterparts.
I think it is clear that the foregoing considerations, taken as a whole, establish that on the traditional ways of categorizing conditionals biscuit conditionals spill over the morphosyntactic line between indicative and subjunctive conditionals.⁸ So arguments that appeal to the features of biscuit conditionals spill over the line as well. In one such argument, Keith DeRose and Richard Grandy hold the "conditional assertion" view on familiar indicative biscuit conditionals to "generate[s] signi cant support for taking indicative conditionals to be devices of conditional assertion" (, ). Aer all, a theory that treats biscuit conditionals and other conditionals in a uni ed way is, ceteris paribus, a better theory than a theory that gives them a bifurcated treatment. e cases above suggest that to the extent that the phenomena associated with biscuit conditionals motivate a given view on indicative conditionals, they motivate an analogous view on at least some subjunctive conditionals. Extending suppositional views of indicative conditionals to subjunctives is bold and ⁷anks to Kai von Fintel and Franz Huber for translations, judgments, and helpful discussion. ⁸ere are some passing discussions of Philip Johnson-Laird's "If you had needed some money, there was some in the bank" (, ) and similar examples in the literature. But I think JohnsonLaird is right to emphasize that in examples like these the antecedents target "alternative histories" while the consequents target "actual states" (). Declerck and Reed concur, saying that in the conditional "If you had been hungry, there was plenty of food in the fridge, " "an imaginary P-clause combines with a factual Q-clause" (). ese conditionals are thus at best "hybrids between subjunctive and indicative" (F , ) . For other brief discussions of this kind of biscuit conditional, see MC ,  F , and S b.
uncommon, but not unprecedented.⁹ ose who would resist generalizing views like Edgington's to subjunctive conditionals might well run DeRose and Grandy's unication argument against them, claiming that given certain constraints on our theories of subjunctive conditionals-for example, the constraint that subjunctive conditionals express propositions-the existence of subjunctive biscuit conditionals suggests that we need a less radical analysis of biscuit conditionals in general.
. Subjunctive stand-off conditionals
Suppose that Al, Bert, Carl, Dawn, Eve, and Fran are siblings. It's common ground that their parents are considering taking a trip to London, and that if they go they will bring Al, Bert, Carl, and exactly one of Dawn, Eve, and Fran. From different vantage points, Al and Bert witness a conversation between their parents and at least some of their siblings. From his vantage point, Al sees Dawn, Eve, and Fran walk into the room, sees Fran leave, and hears another sibling leave. He then hears their parents telling either Dawn or Eve (he's not sure which) that they will take her if they go. From his vantage point, Bert sees Dawn, Eve, and Fran walk into the room, hears a sibling leave, and sees Eve leave. He then hears their parents telling either Dawn or Fran (he's not sure which) that they will take her if they go. Later, Al says to Carl: () I want to go to London. We would see Big Ben, and the Tate Modern. And if Dawn weren't with us, Eve would be, although Fran wouldn't be.
And Bert says to Carl:
() I want to go to London. We would see Big Ben, and the Tate Modern. And if Dawn weren't with us, Fran would be, although Eve wouldn't be.
Al and Bert's subjunctive conditionals constitute a Gibbardian stand-off. ⁰ Although those conditionals have the same antecedents, they have contradictory consequents, and yet
Neither [Al nor Bert] has any relevant false beliefs, and indeed both may well suspect the whole relevant truth. Neither, then, could sincerely be ⁹For discussion see S a, b, and , and E , , a, and . It is also worth noting that Edgington (, -) and Michael Woods (, -) appeal to conditional questions that are reminiscent of biscuit conditionals to support conditional speech act analyses, and there are subjunctive conditional questions: see I & R . ⁰is framework for setting up a Gibbardian stand-off-namely, providing a single source of evidence that underwrites very different conditional probabilities when that source of evidence is incompletely but accurately apprehended from different vantage points-is originally due to E b, . asserting anything false. Each is sincere, and so each, if he is asserting a proposition at all, is asserting a true proposition (G , ) . e same case generates Gibbardian stand-offs with subjunctive conditionals about the past. Suppose that a uneventful year passes; no one goes to London. Al says to Carl:
() I wish we had gone to London. We would have seen Big Ben, and the Tate Modern. And if Dawn hadn't been the sister with us, Eve would have been.
() I wish we had gone to London. We would have seen Big Ben, and the Tate Modern. And if Dawn hadn't been the sister with us, Fran would have been.
Again, the conditionals that Al and Bert use here have the same antecedents, and contradictory consequents. And yet it seems that neither Al nor Bert has any relevant false beliefs. Many see the familiar stand-off cases in the literature as a serious challenge for truth-conditional semantics for indicative conditionals. For example, Gibbard argues that "e only apparent way to reconcile [a stand-off] with Conditional Noncontradiction"-i.e., with the validity of "a →b is inconsistent with a → b"-is to hold that the proposition expressed by one speaker uttering a given sentence in the stand-off is different than the proposition that the other speaker would have expressed using exactly the same sentence (-). Gibbard sketches a semantics with this consequence, but in uentially objects that it involves "radical dependence" of the proposition expressed on the doxastic state of the speaker (). Angelika Kratzer embraces that kind of context sensitivity as support for her view that an indicative conditional is, in effect, a subjective epistemic modal with the modal base explicitly restricted by the conditional's antecedent. When we have a Gibbardian stand-off, she writes, "indicative conditionals are interpreted with respect to the evidence available to their utterers. But this means that they are implicitly modalized" (, ).
e conditionals in ()-() suggest that stand-off cases for subjunctive conditionals are as serious a challenge for truth-conditional semantics for subjunctive conditionals as familiar stand-off cases are for truth-conditional semantics for indicative conditionals. And to the extent that stand-off cases help motivate a particular truthconditional account of indicative conditionals, they also help motivate an analogous truth-conditional account of at least some subjunctive conditionals. So if Kratzer is right that Gibbardian stand-offs for indicative conditionals support the hypothesis that some indicative conditionals should be treated as epistemic modals, then Gibbardian stand-offs for subjunctive conditionals support the hypothesis that some subjunctive conditionals-like ()-()-should be treated as epistemic modals. is hypothesis brings in its wake the "radical dependence" of the proposition expressed on the speaker's doxastic state, but this time with subjunctive conditionals. Other parameterized analyses, like that of L , will similarly have to spread "radical dependence" on the speaker's doxastic state into certain subjunctives.
On the other hand, to the extent that Gibbardian stand-offs for indicative conditionals support the hypothesis that some indicative conditionals lack truth conditions, or that their truth conditions do not fully characterize their content, it seems that Gibbardian stand-offs for subjunctive conditionals support the hypothesis that some subjunctive conditionals lack truth conditions. Edgington would welcome this conclusion (see especially her ), and she too has argued that some subjunctive conditionals exhibit the Gibbard phenomenon. But many advocates of 'no-truthvalue' theories of indicative conditionals, including Gibbard and Bennett, might well be reluctant to say that some perfectly meaningful subjunctive conditionals lack truth values. And recently W , S , and others have suggested that Gibbardian stand-offs lend support to the view that at least some indicative conditionals demand a "relativist" semantics. ⁴ If that's right, then subjunctive Gibbardian stand-offs lend support to the view that at least some subjunctive conditionals demand a relativist semantics.
What I have tried to show in this section is that Gibbardian stand-offs spill over the morphosyntactic line between indicative and subjunctive conditionals, in such a way that arguments that appeal to Gibbardian stand-offs spill over the line as well. For all I have said here there is nevertheless a semantic distinction between (say) "epistemic conditionals" and "nearness conditionals" (G , ) . But subjunctive morphology is easy enough to slip into discussions of wishes and wants that it is hard to sustain the view that the indicative/subjunctive distinction in the morphology and syntax of conditionals, as we currently conceive of it, correlates with any such semantic distinction.
For discussion of other putative reasons to think there are 'epistemic' subjunctive conditionals, see K  and ; H ; M ; L & R ; R ; V  (but compare his , -); and S . In his  Veltman says he "doubts" that counterfactuals have epistemic readings, but the basis for his doubt is that "only people who have gone through the same epistemic process" as the speaker would be able to "appreciate" such readings (). Whatever its merits with respect to standard examples, this consideration isn't relevant to my examples of subjunctive stand-offs.
See, e.g., G ; S ; B  and ; E , , and b; and W . See her , , and b; see also M . My cases do without Edgington's assumption that " 'If Jones had … he would have …' expresses at a later time what 'If Jones does …, he will …' expressed at an earlier time" (b,  My (), (), and () are further grist for this mill. For example, () does not carry the presupposition that one would not be so inclined, on vacationing in a posh hotel in London; and () does not carry the presupposition that Dawn would not be in London if the speaker's wants were satis ed.
() I want to go to London. We would see Big Ben, and the Tate Modern. And if Dawn weren't with us, Eve would be, although Fran wouldn't be.
None of these examples have the strong inferential avor of () and ().
⁵See also K & P , P , I , and I  and . ⁶is particular example is due to A , , but see also F , chapter , and C , .
. Conclusion
I hope to have strengthened and broadened the case for thinking that indicative and subjunctive conditionals are more similar to each other than one might have expected. In particular, whether a conditional has indicative or subjunctive morphosyntax is orthogonal both to whether it is a biscuit conditional and to whether it is a stand-off conditional. So we should seek analyses of indicative biscuit and standoff conditionals that generalize to their subjunctive cousins. And we should not think that a theory of subjunctive conditionals is complete unless it can account for their biscuit and stand-off uses.
